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BATHROOM BIAS: MAKING THE CASE FOR TRANS
RIGHTS UNDER DISABILITY LAW
Daniella A. Schmidt*
Disability law is one of the more successful tools currently being used
to protect trans people fom discrimination. While the use ofdisabil-
ity law as a famework for affirming or creating trans rights has
come with some success, many in the community remain reluctant to
use disability law for fear of the policy implications and stigma asso-
ciated with medicalization of trans identity. After exploring the cur-
rent state of the law on both the federal and state level, this Note
will argue how disability law both could and should be used more
often to further trans protections. In particular, this Note will look
at the role of bathroom access in the fight for trans civil liberties and
how disability law might be used to affirm trans people's access in
the workplace to gendered bathrooms that accord with their lived
sex.
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Reading about identity politics leads to questions about the author's subject
position. I am a cis woman. This Note is therefore written entirely from the
perspective of someone who has at no point identified as trans.
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Ben is a trans man.' He began socially transitioning six months ago.
Ben began his transition while working for a large company in the
United States. He had been working for the company for several
1. There are a number of terms that are widely used to refer to a "trans" person. It
should be acknowledged that these words are often understood to mean different
things by different people, and that there is strong disagreement about how, or
whether, some of these words should be used. The following are working definitions
for the various terms that appear throughout this Note. I will generally use the term
"trans" to refer to people who identify as transgender or transsexual. These defini-
tions are a slightly altered version of those used by The University of Michigan Law
School Outlaws for various presentations. See, e.g., Trans 101 Workshop, OurLws,
(Mar. 4, 2010, 7:11 PM), http://blog.umoutlaws.org/2010/03/trans- 101-
workshop.html.
Transgender A broad umbrella term that applies to people who embody an
innate sense of gender identity other than their sex assigned at birth.
Transsexual: Persons who seek to live in a gender different from the one as-
signed at birth and who may seek or want medical intervention (through
hormones and/or surgery) for them to live comfortably in that gender.
Cisgender Persons whose gender identity and gender assignment at birth
match.
Transman: A person who was assigned female at birth but identifies as male.
Trans men are sometimes referred to as "female-to-male" or FTM.
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years before deciding to transition. The County Clerk's office has
already granted Ben his name change. Though Ben is taking hor-
mones, he cannot afford surgery to treat his gender dysphoria2, but
hopes to be able to in the future. Ben is waiting to change the sex
marker on his legal documents until after he has completed surgery.3
Recently, Ben decided to inform his company of his transition and
his preferred name. In addition, Ben has requested access to the
men restroom. The company has summarily rejected Ben ' request
Trans woman: A person who was assigned male at birth but identifies as fe-
male. Trans women are sometimes referred to as "male-to-female" or MTF.
Sex- Refers to the designation of the variety of biological differences between
females and males. Not everyone fits into two categories.
Gender identity: Self-conception of one's gender, which may or may not be
congruent with physiology or with gendered stereotypes about men and
women. This describes how people perceive their own internal sense of male-
ness, femaleness, or other gender identity.
Gender expression: Physical manifestation of one's gender identity, often ex-
pressed through clothing, accessories, mannerisms, and chosen names.
Transition: The process of living and being perceived as a gender other than
that assigned at birth. The process of transitioning varies among trans individ-
uals. It may include counseling with a professional therapist, undergoing hor-
mone therapy, having surgery of the face, chest, genitals or other areas,
changing one's name or preferred pronouns, or dressing as the preferred gen-
der. Some transgender people do not medically transition at all, because they
do not have the financial means, do not feel comfortable, fear for their safety,
or do not feel that it is necessary.
Lived sex- Refers to the sex that a trans person has transitioned to, conforming
with his or her gender identity.
2. Gender dysphoria, according to the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), describes "strong and persistent feelings of
discomfort with one's assigned sex, the desire to possess the body of the other sex,
and the desire to be regarded by others as a member of the other sex." Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 535 (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, 4th ed.
2000).
Note also that practitioners and advocates use different language to refer to
trans-related surgeries. Some examples include: sex reassignment surgery or gender
confirmation surgery. See, e.g., Victory! Transgender Woman Wins Insurance Coverage
for Sex Reassignment Surgery, TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND (Oct. 3,
2012), http://transgenderlegal.org/headlineshow.php?id=384 (using "sex reassign-
ment surgery" to refer to trans-related surgery); Loren S. Schechter, 'Gender Confir-
mation Surgery' What's in a Name?, HUFFINGTON POST (April 20, 2012, 11:14
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/loren-s-schechter-md-facs/gender-confirma-
tion-surgery.b 1442262.html (discussing why Schechter refers to trans-related sur-
gery as "gender confirmation surgery").
3. It is important to note that in some states, Ben may have to have surgery before
changing his sex marker. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §22-9A-19(d) (Westlaw through 2012
Regular and First Special Sessions).
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and has told Ben he is welcome to use the women ' restroom or the
single-stall handicap restroom located in a different part of the
building. Ben is considered an exemplary employee by his colleagues
and supervisors alike.4
Does prohibiting Ben, a trans man, from using the men's bathroom at
his place of employment constitute legally actionable discrimination under
any federal or state law where all other male employees at the company are
permitted to use the male bathroom? In particular, does it constitute dis-
crimination under disability law? If so, where? Why? How can a trans advo-
cate make the argument? What are the implications of arguing that it is
disability discrimination?
Before trying to answer the above questions, it is important to under-
stand how bathrooms have played a unique role in the fight for civil liber-
ties. Their importance is easy to overlook, yet over the years, controlling
bathroom access has been used as a tool to degrade and deny full integra-
tion. Integration aside, for trans individuals, such a denial can also be medi-
cally harmful. When employers deny trans employees access to gendered
bathrooms,5 the denial has the potential to aggravate existing medical condi-
tions. In addition, it might lead to the development of bladder and kidney
infections and negative psychological effects, including heightened gender
dysphoric symptoms, which could derail treatment of gender dysphoria and
depression. The medical harms and the harms to dignity of bathroom denial
to trans people are the result of a rejection of trans identity. Denial of bath-
room access perpetuates the "othering" of trans people and leads to the
continued violence and harassment of trans people nation-wide. 6 Bath-
4. Ben's story is a hypothetical used to demonstrate one of the many injustices that
plague the lives of trans people in our society. Unfortunately, Ben's story is common
for trans people in work places, schools, and public accommodations across the
country. For stories of discrimination just like this one, contact the help centers at
organizations such as the Transgender Legal Defense and Education Fund, Sylvia
Rivera Law Project, Lambda Legal, and the Transgender Law Center.
5. Note that in some cases employers deny access to all bathrooms and not just
gendered ones.
6. The violence takes several forms including, but not limited to, physical abuse by
police officers and civilians, as well as the psychological abuse of continually requir-
ing trans people to justify their personhood. See, e.g., Hate Crimes, NAT'L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUALTY, http://transequality.org/Issues/issues-hate crimes.html
(last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (detailing legislative responses to hate crimes against trans
people); Bob Moser, Violence Engul Transgendered Population in D.C, S. POVERTY
LAw CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-
issues/2003/winter/disposable-people (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (also appeared in
the Winter 2003 edition of Intelligence Report); Ali, After Yet Another Trans
Woman's Murder, Change is Coming for Hate Crime Sentencing in DC, AUTOSTRAD-
158 [Vol. 20:155
BATHROOM BIAS
rooms, therefore, cannot be underestimated as an integral element in the
trans fight for equality.
This Note considers the right of trans people to use the bathroom of
their lived sex while at work. Title VII claims and sexual orientation dis-
crimination claims have brought many trans litigants and advocates to a
dead end in the fight for trans equality. A new strategy is necessary to ad-
vance trans rights; I argue that state disability laws in numerous jurisdictions
should be read and interpreted as providing this right. Federal disability
laws, including the Federal Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, have explicitly excluded trans people from protections against
disability discrimination. Trans people are therefore prohibited from bring-
ing claims of disability discrimination under federal anti-discrimination
laws. However, as this Note will explore, many state disability laws do not
have explicit exceptions written into their disability law protections for trans
people. This lack of exclusion leaves room for trans litigants to argue that
they should be protected under state disability discrimination provisions.
Disability law7 offers a relatively new framework to conceive of trans
protections and, over the past few years, has proven to have clear benefits in
the courtroom." However, using disability law as the framework to advocate
for trans rights has come with some strong criticism. Some advocates argue
that using the disability law framework stigmatizes trans individuals, per-
petuates the medicalization of trans identity, and perpetuates stereotypes
about trans people as inherently "flawed". In this Note, I explain that those
DLE (Feb 3, 2013) http://www.autostraddle.com/after-yet-another-trans-womans-
murder-change-is-coming-for-hate-crime-sentencing-in-dc-155563/.
7. Throughout this Note, "disability law" refers to both state and federal disability anti-
discrimination laws and jurisprudence.
8. I have often wondered why it is that trans activists do not fight for an entirely new
framework of anti-discrimination laws to protect trans people. In Paisley Currah &
Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve judicial and Legisla-
tive Equality for Transgender People, 7 Wm. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 38 (2000),
the authors explain that trans discrimination is rooted in stereotypes, in "how men
and women are 'supposed' to behave and . . . how male and female bodies are
'supposed' to appear." Such stereotyping is neither new nor unique to the trans
community but fits into the already developed frameworks of sex, sexual orientation,
gender and disability discrimination. Id. As a result, Currah and Minter argue that it
might make the most sense to work with the tools we already have. Id. at 38-39.
Whether or not the legal tools we have will prove effective is something only time
will tell.
Regarding the political viability and subsequent legislative granting of bath-
room access, this Note will demonstrate that there are instances where state legisla-
tures have passed laws requiring that employers provide access to gender-identity
appropriate bathrooms. It is not that the legislative model of social reform is entirely
off the table, it is just difficult and requires a more holistic effort that includes com-
munity organizing and political participation.
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who argue against its use on the aforementioned grounds misconceive the
disability law framework and the disability rights movement's goals. I argue
that using disability law is not a concession to having a flawed body. The
disability rights movement rightly advances the theory that people with dis-
abilities are capable of full participation in society but are unable to partici-
pate equally due to normative conditions that privilege certain bodies. The
same is true for trans people. I will argue that disability law, where available,
should be used in the fight to protect trans people from discrimination,
despite the policy concerns.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I examines some of the discrim-
ination trans people in the United States face today and the ramifications of
those harms specifically as they relate to the work place and bathroom ac-
cess. Part II presents the current state of disability law vis-A-vis trans inclu-
sion, exclusion, or silence on the matter. Part III argues the case for Ben,
demonstrating how one might argue under disability law that denying Ben
access to the men's bathroom at work is discrimination. I will briefly outline
arguments under the theories of disparate treatment, disparate impact, and
reasonable accommodation. Part IV concludes with the policy implications
of using disability law to effectuate trans protections. Finally, I reinforce my
original conclusion that the utility of the disability framework outweighs
the potential repercussions of its use.'
I. THE BATTLE OVER BATHROOM ACCESS
A. Why Bathrooms?
In his poem, Award, Ray Durem wrote: "I just don't know how to go
to the bathroom in the free world."1o Durem was referencing the difficulties
of a mixed-race man trying to use a bathroom in Texas in the early 1900s.
Bathrooms, while not the center of any civil rights agenda, have always been
an integral part of the fight for equality. The 1950s saw a fight against the
practice of prohibiting black people from using "white" bathrooms." The
1970s saw the Women's Liberation fight against the lack of bathrooms pro-
vided by employers in light of the influx of female employees.12 The 1980s
9. Disability law might prove to be a preferred framework for some in the gender queer
community by virtue of its flexibility and ultimate dismissal of the gender and sex
binary upon which sex and gender discrimination protections are predicated.
10. ARNOLD ADOFF, THE POETRY OF BLACK AMERICA: ANTHOLOGY OF THE 20TH
CENTURY, 153 (1973).
11. Carlos Ball, Why Bathrooms Are a Civil Rights Issue, HUFFINGTON POST POLITICS,





saw the disability rights movement fight for wheelchair-accessible
bathrooms. 13
The notion that civil rights movements face more severe, pressing
problems than bathroom access is misguided in multiple ways. Controlling
the way people use bathrooms, and whether they are permitted to use them
at all, has been used historically as a tool to dehumanize minority groups.1 4
Many civil rights activists assert that denying a person access to bathrooms
is one of the greatest obstacles to full integration.'5 The minimalist stance
on the importance of bathrooms fails to appreciate the role bathrooms play
in the lives of all people and speaks to a dominant culture that takes bath-
room access for granted. Imagine a world where you either could not use
the bathroom, or where every time you tried to use the bathroom, you
could expect to be confronted with violence or harassment.
Bathroom segregation in the work place especially highlights the sys-
temic and institutionalized discrimination against trans people. It is settled
law that an employer may not assign bathroom usage based on race, that
equivalent bathrooms for men and women need to be provided, and that
bathrooms must be accessible to persons with disabilities. Despite the pro-
tections afforded to other members of the population, employers may still
inquire about and pass judgment upon a trans person's genitals. The fight
for equal access to bathrooms generally, and workplace bathrooms specifi-
cally, fits directly into the narrative of civil liberties in so much as it is a
question of equality, dignity, safety, and respect for all people.
B. Denied Bathroom Access and its Effects on Trans People
Denying trans people access to bathrooms that accord with their lived
sex can result in serious medical harm and can be physically and psychologi-
cally debilitating. Leslie Feinberg, a trans activist and author, writes that
trans people "live under the constant threat of horrifying violence. We have
to worry about what bathroom to use when our bladders are aching. We are
forced to consider whether we'll be dragged out of a bathroom and arrested
or face a fistfight while our bladders are still aching."' 6 Worse yet is the fear
of police violence: "The use of the 'wrong' bathroom . . . often results in
13. Id
14. Ask Lambda Legal: Know Your Rights, LAMBDA LEGAL IMPACT, Summer 2011, at 6,
available at http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/downloads/impact 201106_ask
-lambda-legal.pdf.
15. Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133 (2010).
16. LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANs LIBERATION: BEYOND PINK OR BLUE, 68 (1998).
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arrests for crimes such as public lewdness, public obscenity, [and] public
indecency."' 7
The Sylvia Rivera Law Project (SRLP)1 8 in New York City released a
documentary in 2003 titled "Toilet Talk" on the persistent discrimination
and violence that trans people face in bathrooms, specifically in the work
place, in schools, and in other public spaces.'9 "Toilet Talk" discusses the
serious physical health problems associated with not being able to use the
bathroom: bladder and kidney infections, cystitis, chronic dehydration, and
urinary stones. This is coupled with the mental health effects trans people
often experience due to denied bathrooms access, such as depression, anxi-
ety, and feelings of inadequacy.20 As one individual in the documentary
notes, "It's just depressing to be at work ... to have this pressing biological
function, and you're afraid someone's going to see you, am I going to have
to wait until there's no one in the hallway . . . the entire situation is anxiety
provoking ... it's damaging."21 In 2002, the San Francisco Human Rights
Commission surveyed various trans individuals about, among other things,
bathroom usage. One respondent wrote:
I have spent so many hours avoiding public multi-stall bath-
rooms that I have damaged my bladder and put pressure on my
kidneys. The problem was a daily one. I'd think about where I
was going, what bathrooms I'd have access to, how much I
drank during the day, whether I'd be with people who could
help stand guard .... 22
Furthermore, the dehydrating effects of limiting liquid intake during the
workday in an effort to avoid the bathroom can have separate and serious
negative health effects as well.23 The U.S. Occupational Safety and Hazards
Administration (OSHA) declared "delayed voiding" to be detrimental to a
17. Pooja Gehi, Struggles fom the Margins: Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the Impact on
Low-Income Transgender People of Color, 30WOMEN's Rrs. L. REP. 315, 326 (2009).
18. SRLP is an organization dedicated to ending poverty and gender identity discrimina-
tion. For more information on SRLP visit: www.srlp.org.
19. Tara Mateik and Sylvia Rivera Law Project, Toilet Training Documentary Trailer, Sm-




22. Levi & Redman, supra note 15, at 136-37.
23. Transgender Rights Toolkit: Equal Access to Public Restrooms, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://
www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/trt-equal-access-to-
public-restrooms_1.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
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person's health.24 Workplace policies preventing people from using the
bathroom encourage this unhealthy behavior.
For all the reasons stated above, the trans community has been forced
to adapt, creating websites like safe2pee.org to provide a searchable database
for single occupancy and gender-neutral bathrooms in the United States,
Canada, and Mexico for trans people too afraid to use multi-stall public
bathrooms.25 Cell phone applications, like "Pee in Peace," are being devel-
oped entirely to help trans and gender non-conforming people easily locate
single-stall or gender-neutral bathrooms. 26 These innovations, however, are
unable to fully mitigate the damages, both physical and mental, that trans
people experience when denied bathrooms access.
C Theories on Why Trans People are Denied Bathroom Access
There are two overarching concerns often cited by those opposed to
permitting trans people access to a bathroom that accords with their lived
sex: fear of sexual violence and notions of privacy. 27 When excluding trans
people from disability protections, the federal government statutorily placed
trans people on a list of people with "divergent" sexual interests, including
pedophiles, exhibitionists, and voyeurs. 28 In the United States there is a per-
vasive and institutionalized fear that trans people are sexual predators.29 This
fear is, however, entirely unfounded.30 Moreover, the logic that bathrooms
will be made safer simply by placing a "men only" or "women only" sign on
the bathroom door is entirely unsound. Sexual predators, regardless of sex,
will not likely refrain from entering a bathroom simply because a sign on
the door says that they are not allowed to enter. Whether or not a sexual
24. Id.
25. SAFE2PEE.ORG: BATHROOMS FOR EVERYONE, http://safe2pee.org/new/ (last visited
Feb. 7, 2013).
26. PEE IN PEACE, http://peeinpeace.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
27. Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and judicial
Identity, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 369 (1999) (discussing how stereotypes
about the trans community incite discrimination).
28. 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20)(F)(i) (Westlaw through PL 112-207); Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1221 1(b)(1) (Westlaw through P.L. 112-207).
29. See Susan Etta Keller, supra note 27, at 369.
30. See, e.g., Delano Garvey, Sexual Villainy: A Sex Offender Profile, (Oct. 2009) http://
www.oocities.org/vandelist/research.htm (user archive mirrored from Geocities)
(noting that the typical sex predator is a single middle-aged Caucasian (presumably
cis) male).
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predator's entrance is legal will not affect the propensity to commit a further
illegal act. 31
The second overarching concern cited is privacy. The Eighth Circuit
stated in Sommers v. Budget Marketing, that while the court was not un-
mindful of the problem the trans plaintiff was facing, the employer faced a
"problem in protecting the privacy interests of its female employees."32
However, author Susan Keller argues in Operations ofLegal Rhetoric: Exam-
ining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, that no one should feel an over-
whelming sense of privacy when using a public bathroom.33 Keller explains
that privacy in a public bathroom is oxymoronic because one is required to
share public and workplace bathrooms with other people, making them in-
herently not private.34 Furthermore, courts have made exceptions to this
type of "privacy" challenge in the past. There are a number of prison cases
addressing the privacy rights of female inmates housed with trans women in
female-designated corrections facilities. For example, in Crosby v. Reynolds,
the court rejected a privacy claim of a cisgender female detainee housed in a
cell with a trans woman who had not had genital surgery, based on the
premise that the trans woman's physical and psychological interests would
be best served by being housed with other women.3 5
It should not go without mentioning that the latent concern in the
battle for trans access to the correct bathroom is the maintenance of gender
and sexuality norms. The defendants in Ettsity v. Utah Transit Authority36
argued in their brief that permitting trans people access to the correct bath-
room would be equivalent to "a federally protected right for male workers to
wear nail polish and dresses and speak in falsetto and mince about in high
heels, or for female ditch diggers to strip to the waist in hot weather."7 On
some level, transphobia and the discourse of normativity is driven by the
urge to maintain the status quo-the gender and sex binary.
II. THE LAY OF THE LAND
Employment discrimination law, namely Title VII, and federal disa-
bility law do not provide any meaningful recourse to trans people con-
31. Diana Elkind, Comment, The Constitutional Implications ofBathroom Access Based on
Gender Identity: An Examination of Recent Developments Paving the Way for the Next
Frontier of Equal Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 925 n.170 (2007).
32. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cit. 1982).
33. Keller, supra note 27, at 370.
34. Id.
35. Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F. Supp. 666, 667, 670 (D. Me. 1991).
36. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007).
37. Brief of Appellees Utah Transit Authority and Betty Shirley at 16, Etsitty v. Utah
Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cit. 2007) (No. 05-4193).
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fronting bathroom access problems at work. However, state and city
disability law hold promise.
A. Title VII Claim as a Form of Protection?
Many attorneys and advocates for trans rights used to seek protection
under Title VII, the federal law that prohibits employers from discriminat-
ing against their employees on the basis of sex. After all, it is literally "be-
cause of sex" that trans people are discriminated against, most often because
their assigned sex at birth or genitals do not accord with their lived sex.3 8
The discrimination is predicated on normative beliefs about how men and
women should act and look, as well as the belief that people cannot, and
should not, change their gender or sex. 39 However, Title VII sex discrimina-
tion arguments have fallen short of offering full protection for trans
employees.
The relevant Title VII case law appears to provide a useful model for
protecting against trans discrimination. However, Title VII falls short of
protecting trans employees by failing to move beyond sex stereotyping as sex
discrimination 4o into full protection for a person based on trans status
alone. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court ruled that a per-
son could bring a Title VII claim against an employer who discriminated
against an employee for not conforming to gender stereotypes. 4 ' In Price
Waterhouse, a female employee was discriminated against for acting in a
"masculine" way by being aggressive and refusing to wear makeup. Several
courts have recognized analogous Title VII "sex stereotyping" claims for
trans persons. For example, in Rosa v. Park West Bank 'r Trust Co., the First
Circuit ruled, citing Price Waterhouse, that a woman, wearing female attire,
could not be denied a loan application at a Massachusetts bank simply be-
cause she had been assigned male at birth and her attire did not accord with
that assignment. 42 In Schwenk v. Hartford, the Ninth Circuit stated that
under Price Waterhouse, Title VII protected against not only discrimination
based on the biological differences between a man and a woman, but also
the failure to conform to gender expectations.4 3 However, the Seventh Cir-
38. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F.Supp.2d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2006).
39. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDEN-
TrrY xiii (1999) (discussing harassment as a means of "shoring up gender
normativity").
40. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
41. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
42. Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2000).
43. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Barnes v.
City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729,737 (6th Cit. 2005) (following Smith v. City of
Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d. 566 (6th Cit. 2004)).
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cuit in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. held that Title VII did not protect
trans people from sex discrimination. Karen Ulane had been a pilot for
Eastern Airlines for over ten years when she decided to undergo sex reassign-
ment surgery. 44 Ulane was quickly discharged from her position with East-
ern.45 The Seventh Circuit held that the plain meaning of the prohibition of
sex discrimination was to make unlawful discrimination "against women
because they are women and against men because they are men. The words
of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual
identity disorder, i.e., a person born with a male body who believes himself
to be female." 46
While trans people may be able to successfully allege a sex discrimina-
tion claim under a sex stereotyping theory, since Ulane the courts have con-
sistently found that they are not protected under the language of Title VII
and therefore cannot make a claim under Title VII based on their trans
status alone.4 7
B. Sexual Orientation Claims as a Form of Protection?
To seek protection against discrimination under sexual-orientation
anti-discrimination laws is to conflate trans status with homosexuality.
Trans people are often discriminated against because people perceive them
to be gay, based in part on their gender expression, without the aggressor
actually knowing that the trans person is gay. The discrimination is there-
fore not because a person is gay but rather because they are perceived as
such. A trans person might not identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or queer,
but due to normative perceptions of gender presentation will appear to
many people to be gay. Affirming rights under sexual orientation protec-
tions would not protect those trans people who do not appear gay or who
are not gay. For example, in Evans v. Hamburger Hamlet & Forncrook, a
plaintiffs claim under sexual orientation anti-discrimination protections
failed when the Human Rights Commission in Illinois held that discrimina-
tion against a trans person was not covered because the discrimination did
44. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 1984).
45. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082.
46. U/tne, 742 F.2d at 1085.
47. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007)
("[D]iscrimination against a transsexual based on the person's status as a transsexual
is not discrimination because of sex under Title VII."); But cf Schroer v. Billington,
424 F.Supp.2d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2006)("Without good reasons to oppose it, and
with numerous courts now joining its conclusion-albeit under the Price Waterhouse
framework-it may be time to revisit Judge Grady's conclusion in Uane I that dis-
crimination against transsexuals because they are transsexuals is 'literally' discrimina-
tion 'because of . .. sex."').
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not have to do with that person's sexuality.4 1 Moreover, the Commission
found that, generally, the Seventh Circuit did not protect trans people
under a sex discrimination framework.4 9 Notably, the case withstood com-
plete dismissal by virtue of its disability claim.5o
C Gender Identity Claims as a Form of Protection?
Advocates and organizers are pushing for gender identity anti-discrim-
ination legislation specifically designed to protect trans people.5' Such pro-
tection, where enacted, would seem to provide a strong basis on which to
challenge discrimination against trans people in workplace bathrooms.
However, even such protections may be interpreted in ways that do not
support trans people's access to appropriately gendered bathrooms.
Bathroom claims brought under gender identity anti-discrimination
laws may fail because courts see bathroom access as a "sex" issue and not a
"gender" issue. Goins v. West Group, Inc. is one of the most significant deci-
sions in trans jurisprudence because it involves a state Supreme Court's first
interpretation of a prohibition of discrimination against trans people.52 In
Goins, the plaintiff, a trans woman, was asked to use a unisex bathroom on a
different floor after female coworkers expressed concerns about a "man" us-
ing the women's bathroom." Goins refused to use the unisex bathroom and
proceeded to use the women's bathroom." After being threatened with dis-
ciplinary actions, Goins quit and brought suit against her employer.55 The
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the segregation of bathroom facilities
by "biological gender"56 was not discrimination on the basis of gender iden-
tity.5 The decision of the employer to require employees to use the bath-
48. Evans v. Hamburger Hamlet & Forncrook, No. 93-E-1771996, WL 941676 at *3,
(Chi. Comm'n on Human Relations 1996).
49. Evans, WL 941676 at *4.
50. Evans, WL 941676 at *7-9.
51. See, e.g., Transgender Initiative, FORUM FOR EQUAL., http://forumforequality.org/
wordpress/volunteer/projects/transgender-initiative/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (de-
tailing a specific action plan for promoting state and local legislation that includes
gender identity anti-discrimination laws).
52. Jenifer M. Ross-Amato, Transgender Employees & Restroom Designation- Goins v. West
Group, Inc., 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 569 (2002). The Minnesota law prohibited
discrimination based on "sexual orientation," which was defined to include "having
or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with
one's biological maleness or femaleness." Goins v. West Group, Inc., 635 N.W.2d
717, 724 (Minn. 2001).
53. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 721.
54. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 721.
55. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 721.
56. The court never defines these terms-perhaps the court is referring to sex?
57. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 723.
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room that accorded with their sex had nothing to do with their gender
identity.
The court's narrow interpretation of state gender identity protection
leaves Goins in an unhelpful Catch-22. If she argues there has been gender
identity discrimination, she loses because the court says the distinction be-
ing made is about biological sex; yet if she takes her cue from the court and
claims there has been sex discrimination, Goins is likely to be unprotected
under Title VII for the reasons already discussed. As Goins makes clear,
unless gender identity protections are carefully worded, courts may be able
to interpret them in ways that continue to deny trans people the right to use
bathrooms that accord with their lived sex.
D. Using Disability Law to Protect Trans People from Discrimination
State laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability might
offer a winning alternative argument for the legal protection of trans people.
The first step in making the case for trans protections under disability law is
determining whether or not a person's trans status qualifies that person as
"disabled" such that the person can benefit from protection against disabil-
ity discrimination. The stances of the federal government and the various
fifty states on trans inclusion under disability law protections can be catego-
rized into three general approaches: exclusion by statute or by case law,
inclusion by statute or by case law, and no definitive stance to date.
1. Federal Law and States That Expressly Exclude Trans People From
Disability Law Protections Via Statute or Case Law
Federal Law explicitly excludes trans people from protection against
disability discrimination under disability law. There are two main sources
within the federal law that protect disabled people. The first is the Federal
Rehabilitation Act (FRA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability in "programs conducted by federal agencies, in programs receiving
federal financial assistance, in federal employment, and in the employment
practices of federal contractors."58 The second federal protection for dis-
abled people is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which "prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, State and local gov-
ernment, public accommodations, commercial facilities, transportation, and
58. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE CIVIL RGHTs Div. DISABILrlY RIGHTS SECTION, A Guide
to Disability Rights Law (2009), http://www.ada.gov/cguide.htm#anchor65610.
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telecommunications."59 Both the FRA 60 and the ADA 61 expressly exclude
trans people from disability law protection. Placed on a list with the likes of
pedophiles and voyeurs, trans people are categorically denied federal protec-
tion pursuant to a disability discrimination claim.
The explicit exclusion was not in the original FRA but was added after
Congress included the exclusion in the ADA. When Congress passed the
ADA in 1990 it explicitly excluded trans people from the definition of disa-
bility. That same year, Congress amended the definition of disability in the
FRA to reflect the ADA exclusion. 62 Some commentators on the amend-
ments muse that they were added as reactions to federal judges including
"transsexualism" as a disability under the federal law. For example, in 1986,
the court in Blackwellv. U.S. Dept. of Treasury held that a trans plaintiff was
sufficiently handicapped that he could state a claim under the FRA.63
Shortly after the 1990 exclusions, the court in Dobre v. Nat' R.R. Passenger
Corp. (Amtrak) correctly pointed out that any reliance on Blackwell would
overlook the recent amendment to the Act that "unambiguously exclude[ed]
transsexualism from the definition of the phrase 'individual with a disabil-
59. Id.
60. The relevant statute reads:
The term "individual with a disability" does not include an individual on
the basis of-
(i) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gen-
der identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other
sexual behavior disorders;
(ii) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(iii) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use
of drugs.
29 U.S.C.A. § 705 (Westlaw current through P.L. 112-207 approved 12-7-12).
61. The relevant statute reads:
The term "disability" shall not include-
(1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gen-
der identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other
sexual behavior disorders;
(2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of
drugs.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12211 (Westlaw current through P.L. 112-207 approved 12-7-12).
62. Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender People
through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTs 74, 83-84 (Paisley Currah, Rich-
ard M. Juang, & Shannon Price Minter, eds., 2006).
63. Blackwell v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 639 F.Supp 289, 290 (D.D.C. 1986). See also
Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 9446 (D.D.C. 1985).
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ity.'"64 Activists and scholars Jennifer Levi and Bennett Klein of the organi-
zation Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) argue that Congress
must have originally thought that trans people were disabled pursuant to the
federal disability statutes because otherwise the legislature would not have
expressly excluded trans people in the ADA.65 Counter to their argument,
the court in Dobre stated that the amendment "did not effectuate a substan-
tive change in the law, but rather, merely 'clarified the original intent of
Congress as to the parameters of the definition of disabled individual.'" 66
The implications of the legislative decision to explicitly exclude trans
people from federal disability anti-discrimination laws has devastating ef-
fects on the fight for trans inclusion on the state level. State courts and state
legislatures not only look to federal law, such as the ADA, for guidance but
also will sometimes rely on it when interpreting their own state-specific dis-
ability law statutes.67 Various states' reliance on the federal statutes to ex-
clude trans people from disability law protections has had the effect of
creating persuasive precedent for other states who have not yet decided how
to come down on their own state disability law statutes.6 8 Moreover, the
ADA and FRA almost always need to be contended with even if a state
chooses to explicitly include trans people in its definition of disability.
Courts in states that include trans people under disability law generally end
up justifying their conclusions based on an explanation of why their partic-
ular state legislators chose not to follow the federal exclusions.69 In addition
to the federal disability statutes, ten states and Puerto Rico have explicit
64. Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (refer-
ring to 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F)(i)(Westlaw current through P.L. 112-207 approved
12-7-12.)).
65. Levi & Klein, supra note 62, at 84.
66. Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 289 (quoting Winston v. Maine Technical College Sys., 631
A.2d 70, 74 (Maine 1993)).
67. See, e.g., Dobre 850 F. Supp. at 289 (using the express language of the FRA to
exclude trans people from the definition of disability).
68. See, e.g., Evans v. Illinois Dept. of Human Rights, 1997 WL 377118 (Ill. Hum. Rts.
Com.) (rejecting the ADA's explicit transsexualism exclusion and looking to other
states' discrimination laws to conclude that transsexualism might be considered a
disability under the Illinois Human Rights Act.).
69. See Lie v. Sky Publ'n Corp., No. 013117J, 2002 WL 31492397, at *6 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. 7, 2002) (comparing the Massachusetts state disability law with the ADA
definition of disability and stating that: "The court finds more compelling the fact
that this state's legislature has never seen fit to make a similar amendment."); Enri-
quez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(distinguishing New Jersey human rights law from the ADA, which expressly ex-




statutory exclusions that prevent trans people from accessing the benefits of
the state's anti-discrimination disability laws.70
Pennsylvania courts have interpreted the state's disability discrimina-
tion laws to exclude trans people from protection, despite the fact that the
laws' definition of "handicapped or disabled person" does not include ex-
plicit exclusionary language.7 ' A Pennsylvania court ruled in Holt v. Nw. Pa.
TrainingP'ship Consortium, Inc. that "transsexualism" is not a protected dis-
ability under the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act despite the fact that it is
not expressly excluded.72 A few years prior, a federal court interpreting
Pennsylvania law held in Dobre that the fact that "transsexualism" is a
diagnosable condition does not lead to the conclusion that it is an "impair-
ment" under Pennsylvania Law § 44.4, the Pennsylvania statutory provision
that protects against discrimination on the basis of handicap or disability.73
North Carolina has had only one case that explicitly deals with the
application of disability protections to trans people, Arledge v. Peoples Ser-
vices, Inc..7 The court in Arledge held that a trans plaintiff could not benefit
70. These states include Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 15-1-201 (Westlaw through End
of 1012 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 61st Leg.); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-5-
6(d)(3) (Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN.
§ 15.102(5)(b)(1)(b) (Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); Louisiana, IA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:2232(11)(b) (Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); Nebraska, Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 48-1102(9) (Westlaw through 102nd Leg. 2nd Reg. Sess.); Ohio, OHio REV.
CODE ANN. § 4112.01 (A)(16)(b)(ii) (Westlaw through all 2011 laws and statewide
issues and 2012 files 70 through 159, 167, 170 to 175, 177, 182, 183, 185, 188
189, 191, 192, 195, 197 to 201 of the 129th GA (2011-2012)); Oklahoma, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1451(6) (Westlaw through Chapter 370 (End) of the 2nd Reg.
Sess. of the 53rd Leg. (2012)); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 659A.130 (Westlaw
through End of the 2012 Reg. Sess. and ballot measures approved at the Nov. 6,
2012 General Election); Puerto Rico, 1 L.P.R.A. § 501 (Westlaw through Dec.
2010); Texas, TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 301.003(6) (Westlaw through the end of
the 2011 Reg. Sess. and First Called Sess. of the 82nd Leg.); Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. § 36-96.1:1 (Westlaw through End of 2012 Reg. Sess. and End of 2012 Sp. S.
I). See also 2011 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 270 (S.B. 837) (West 2011); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 659A. 118 (Westlaw through End of 2012 Reg. Sess. and ballot mea-
sures approved at the Nov. 6, 2012 General Election); and Sommers v. Iowa Civil
Rights Comm'n, 377 N.W.2d 470, 474-76 (Ia. S.Ct. 1983) (holding that transsex-
ualism is not a protected category under the Iowa civil rights statute which requires a
person to be "substantially handicapped" such that he or she has a "physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities. . .").
71. 16 PA. CODE § 44.4 (Westlaw through Pa. Bulletin, Vol 43, Num. 2, dated Jan. 12,
2013).
72. Holt v. Nw. Pa. Training P'ship Consortium, Inc., 694 A.2d 1134, 1138 (Pa.
Comrnw. Ct. 1997).
73. Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 289.
74. Arledge v. Peoples Services, Inc., 02 CVS 1569, 2002 WL 1591690 (N.C. General
Ct., Apr. 18, 2002).
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from disability protection as a matter of public policy because trans people
are not part of the class of people protected under the term "disability" in
North Carolina.75 The court in Arledge relied entirely on the federal exclu-
sions, stating that North Carolina's disability protections are modeled off of
the federal disability laws.76 This case remains inconclusive, as it is an un-
published Superior Court decision. It will be interesting to see what effect
this might have in future North Carolina litigation regarding trans inclu-
sion. The theory promulgated by the North Carolina court stands in direct
contrast to, for example, the Massachusetts courts. Massachusetts courts re-
lied on the federal government's explicit exclusion of trans people under the
definition of disability to conclude that the absence of this exclusion in
Massachusetts' disability laws demonstrated that the state legislature in-
tended to include transgender individuals under the state disability law pro-
tections.77 However, this line of reasoning has been called into question by
the new gender identity protection act (An Act Relative to Gender Identity),
which recently passed in Massachusetts.71 Had the legislature intended to
protect trans people under the disability anti-discrimination law, gender
identity language in the new law would be unnecessary.
2. States that Expressly Include Trans People Under
Disability Law Protections
In eight states, including Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Washington State, as well as
the city of Chicago and the District of Columbia, a person's trans status
does qualify that person for state or city protection against disability dis-
crimination pursuant to the state's anti-discrimination disability laws.79
75. Arledge, 2002 WL 1591690.
76. Arledge, 2002 WL 1591690.
77. See Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 664947 at *4-5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb.
26, 2001); see also Lie v. Sky Publishing Corp., No. 013117J, 2002 WL 31492397
at *5-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2002).
78. An Act Relative to Gender Identity, ch. 199, 2011 Mass. Acts, available at http://
malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/20 11 /Chapter199.
79. Evans v. Hamburger Hamlet & Forncrook, No. 93-E-177, 1996 WL 941676 at *8,
*9 (Chi. Comm'n on Human Relations May 8, 1996) (holding that gender
dysphoria is a disability under the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance); Conway v.
City of Hartford, No. CV 95055303, 1997 WL 78585 at *3, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Feb. 4, 1997) (Connecticut state law covers transsexualism under disability and sex-
ual orientation); Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. City of Hartford
(CHRO), CV094019485S, 2010 WL 4612700 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2010)
(Connecticut state law covers transsexualism under disability and therefore being
discriminated against because of one's trans status is a cognizable claim under the
statute); Smith v. City of Jacksonville Corr. Inst., No. 88-5451, 1991 WL 833882 at
*11, *12 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings Oct. 2, 1991) (holding that an individual with
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However, it is important to note that not all of the states that have inter-
preted their laws to include trans people or have passed legislation concern-
ing trans identity as a disability permit bathroom access in accordance with
a person's gender identity.8o Almost all of the protections come from state
judges interpreting the various state disability statutes to include trans peo-
ple, many by virtue of the state legislature not explicitly excluding trans
people from the definition of disability.
State disability protection thus will sometimes provide a useful avenue
to preventing discrimination against trans people. However, if advocates
succeed in passing carefully-worded state gender identity anti-discrimina-
tion legislation,8I interpreting trans identity as a disability under current
disability law protections will become less useful. It is unlikely a state court
will interpret disability law as covering gender identity where there is ex-
plicit language elsewhere. Moreover, it becomes less likely that trans plain-
gender dysphoria is "disabled" and therefore covered by the Florida Human Rights
Act) (substantially limited by Fishbaugh v. Brevard Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, Order No.
04-103 (Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations 2004)); Lie v. Sky Publishing Corp.,
No. 013117J, 2002 WL 31492397 at *6 (Mass. Super. Oct. 7, 2002) (holding GID
to be a physical or mental impairment that, in its unmitigated form, substantially
impairs one or more major life activities, and therefore transsexual people are covered
under Massachusetts state disability laws); Jetre v. Honey Farms Mini Mkt., 23
M.D.L.R. 229 (Mass. Comm'n Discrim. Oct. 10, 2001) (holding that state law
prohibiting disability discrimination protects transsexual people under Massachusetts
law); Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199 at *6 (Super. Ct. Oct. 11,
2000) (holding that a transsexual person had stated a viable disability claim under
Massachusetts law); Doe v. Electro-Craft Corp., No. 87-B-132, 1988 WL 1091932
at *4 (N.H. Sup. Ct. April 8, 1988) (holding that transsexualism is a disability
within the meaning of the New Hampshire employment discrimination statute);
Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(holding that gender dysphoria is a disability under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination); Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding that
a transsexual youth was protected by New York state law prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of disability); Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1993)
(holding that gender dysphoria is a disability under Washington law); Blackwell v.
U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 830 F.2d 1183 (D.C.Cir. 1987) (recognizing an employment
discrimination claim based on a person's trans status as a handicap covered by the
Federal Rehabilitation Act prior to the addition of the explicit exclusion); Doe v.
United States Postal Service, 37 F.E.P. Cases 1867, 1985 WL 9446 (D.C.Cir.1985)
(recognizing an employment discrimination claim on the basis of a person's trans
status under the FRA prior to the addition of the explicit exclusion).
80. See Non-Discrimination Laws that Include Gender Identity and Expression, TRANS-
GENDER LAW & POLICY INST. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.transgenderlaw.org/
ndlawslindex.htm#restrooms. The following states and cities have explicitly incorpo-
rated language in their anti-discrimination statutes and polices regarding restroom
access: Colorado, Iowa, San Francisco, Washington State and the District of Colum-
bia. Id.
81. See supra Part II-C.
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tiffs would use disability law to challenge discrimination, as it is more likely
that they would utilize the express language of gender identity laws. For
now, though, state disability protections are an important resource for those
seeking to protect trans people from discrimination. I will expand on the
usefulness of disability law as an avenue for social and institutional change
in Parts III and IV.
3. States that Have Not Yet Taken a Stance on the Matter
In thirty-one states, a person's trans status might or might not qualify
that person for protection by the state against discrimination pursuant to
the state's anti-discrimination disability laws.82 In these thirty-one states the
courts and the legislatures have not yet had to answer the question of
whether trans status qualifies as a disability. The outcome is likely to vary
depending on a number of factors: the definition of disability in the relevant
statute; the other states or law review articles that the given state looks to as
persuasive precedent or evidence; the deference to federal statutes; and state
court conclusions based on the absence of an express exclusion of trans peo-
ple in the state statute. 3 It is in the states where the issue remains un-
resolved that framing the disability law case for trans protections has the
most power and influence by virtue of its uncharted territory.
III. THE DIsABILITY LAW CASE
We now return to the hypothetical presented at the beginning of this
Note. Assuming that there are no explicit exclusions or inclusions in the
state where Ben lives, there are three claims under disability law that are
likely to be effective tools for arguing that Ben, and trans men similarly
situated, should have access to the male bathroom at work: disparate treat-
ment, disparate impact, and reasonable accommodation.84
The three theories of disparate treatment, disparate impact, and rea-
sonable accommodation are usually the legal claims available to people with
disabilities in suits against their employers. In general, courts find disparate
treatment when an employer singles out an otherwise capable employee
from a protected class and treats them differently from other employees.5
In this case, the company that Ben works for has created a policy that iso-
lates Ben, as a trans employee, and treats him less favorably as compared to
82. See supra Part II-D-1-2.
83. Inclusion of the definition of disability and the relevant case law for each of the 31
states is beyond the scope of this Note. The relevant material proves inconclusive
regarding inclusion or exclusion of trans people under disability law protections.
84. The same theory would apply to trans women.
85. See, e.g., N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107.
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other company employees. Ben, by virtue of being trans, should be consid-
ered a member of the protected class of people with disabilities.86 The court
finds disparate impact when an employer's otherwise facially neutral policy
has an adverse effect on members of a protected class.87 In this case, the
company's requirement that all employees use the bathroom that accords
with his or her "biological sex" has a detrimental effect on trans people,
whose bodies or anatomy may differ from what is typically associated with
their lived sex. Finally, a court finds a violation of reasonable accommoda-
tion policies when an employer fails to adjust a policy that negatively im-
pacts a disabled employee such that it prevents that person from enjoying
equal rights.88 This adjustment must be reasonable. In this case, the com-
pany's bathroom policy prevents Ben from his right to use the men's bath-
room. Thus, the reasonable accommodation would be to permit Ben to use
the men's bathroom.
A. Trans Status as a Disability
For Ben to argue under any of the theories presented he would have to
establish that he has a disability and that disability has given rise to the
behavior for which he is being discriminated against. Most state disability
laws define a person with a disability as (1) having a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, (2) has a record of
such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 9
Ben would likely need to argue that he has a disability because he has
been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID).9o GID is a mental
and physical disorder. It is typically characterized by a "strong and persistent
desire to be a member of another sex coupled with a continued discomfort
with one's biological sex."91 According to the World Professional Associa-
86. Infra Part III-A.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. This definition is a synthesis of most definitions of disability that appear in various
state statutes. See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 168A-3 (Westlaw through S.L.
2013-1 of the 2013 Regular Session of the General Assembly); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 12-12-8-3.4 (Westlaw through 2012 Second Regular Session); ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 20 § 2405/12a (Westlaw through P.A. 97-1166 of the 2012 Reg. Sess.,
and through P.A. 98-2 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
90. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERs, supra note 2, at
576.
91. Id. I want to be careful here not to conflate trans status with GID. There are several
reasons to avoid this: not all people who are trans or who have medically transitioned
have been diagnosed with GID; WPATH has moved away from the language of
GID as the treatment for gender dysphoria; moreover, if GID were to be removed
from the DSM, the entire argument would be rendered moot.
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tion for Transgender Health (WPATH), the diagnosis of Transsexualism was
introduced in the DSM-III in 1980.92 In 1994, the DSM-IV committee
opted to replace the listing of "Transsexualism" with "Gender Identity Dis-
order."" Note, however, that Gender Dysphoria is to replace GID in the
fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-V), which is
scheduled for release in May 2013.91 It is unclear how the DSM change to
Gender Dysphoria will affect the argument that trans people should be pro-
tected by disability law. However, it may not change the analysis signifi-
cantly, since a diagnosis of Gender Disphoria will likely take the place of
GID. Acquiring a diagnosis of either GID or Gender Dysphoria presents
problems for those trans people who do not have access to health care facili-
ties or are unable to afford medical assistance. The need to obtain a medical
diagnosis in order to be considered disabled thus poses particular difficulties
for low-income trans people.
A diagnosis of GID has proven useful in other areas of the law to
argue that trans health expenses are medical and not cosmetic. The United
States Tax Court recently issued a decision in O'Donnabhain v. Commis-
sioner ofInternal Revenue affirming for the first time that treatment of GID
qualifies as medical care under the Internal Revenue Code, thereby making
the expenses associated with transition-related care deductible, i.e., sex reas-
signment surgery and hormone therapy." The Tax Court decision means
that because GID is a medical condition, all such treatments are medical in
nature and not cosmetic.96 The decision also indicates, however, that a diag-
nosis of GID is likely a prerequisite to these deductions, once again raising
issues of class and access. The IRS argued unsuccessfully that the trans
plaintiff was not suffering from a disease because trans identity is a "social
construct."9 The Tax Court rested its decision in part on the fact that GID
was a "disease" because it is listed in the DSM-IV."
92. STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND
GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE (The World Prof'1 Ass'n for Transgender
Health, 7th ed. 2011), available at http://www.wpath.org/publicationsstandards
.cfm.
93. Id. The 7th Edition of WPATH does not address GID or transsexualism.
94. American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5: The Future ofPsychiatric Diagnosis, DSM-
5 DEVELOPMENT, http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited, Mar. 4,
2013) (giving the release date); Dani Heffernan, The APA Removes "Gender Identity
Disorder" from Updated Mental Health Guide, GLAAD, (Dec. 3, 2012, 11:38 AM),
http://www.glaad.org/blog/apa-removes-gender-identity-disorder-updated-mental-
health-guide (discussing the change).
95. O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 134 T.C. 34, 59 (2010).
96. O'Donnabbain, 134 T.C. at 59.
97. O'Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 59.
98. O'Donnabbain, 134 T.C. at 60.
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In addition, trans status is arguably a disability because being trans
substantially limits major life activities. Some trans people are required to
regularly self-administer medically related treatments including hormones,
or seek out medical professionals on a regular basis for treatments like long-
term electrolysis sessions. If disability in a state statute is defined by the need
for continued and long-term medical care and services, many trans people
would qualify.
B. Disparate Treatment Claim
Having established that there is a strong argument that trans people
should be protected by disability law, Ben could bring a claim under a dis-
parate treatment theory. The company's insistence that Ben use the handi-
cap-accessible bathroom or the bathroom that does not accord with his sex
as male (i.e., the women's bathroom) is arguably predicated on the fact that
Ben is a trans man. Thus his disability has given rise to the behavior for
which he is being discriminated against. But what exactly does it mean to
not be "man" enough to use the male bathroom? New York State courts
have rejected the idea that sex is based on genitalia alone. In Maffei v. Ko-
laeton Industry, Inc., the court noted that:
At birth, sex is identified by external genitalia. However, experts
now generally agree that there are at least seven variables that
interact to determine the ultimate sex of an individual, to wit: 1)
Chromosomes (XX female, XY male; 2) Gonads (ovaries or tes-
tes); 3) Hormonal secretions (androgens for males or estrogens
for females); 4) Internal reproductive organs (uterus or prostate);
5) External genitalia; 6) Secondary sexual characteristics; and 7)
Self-identity.99
It is likely the case that an employer's refusal to permit a trans man to use
the male bathroom is based on genitals alone and that a variety of other
transition-related surgeries would likely not satisfy the company's policy
(i.e., top surgery, hysterectomy etc.).
The focus on Ben's genitals, as opposed to any of the other sex charac-
teristics noted in the New York State decision, also speaks to other concerns
that the company may have in permitting Ben to use the male bathroom. As
noted in Part I, Section C, the two major concerns are sexual violence and
privacy. In a workplace setting it is unlikely that sexual violence would be
the predominant concern, considering most employees are familiar with one
another and would be able to quickly identify any perpetrators. The more
99. Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 394 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
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likely concern is that the other male employees would feel that their privacy
interests are implicated by permitting a trans man to use the bathroom with
them; in other words, the other male employees may be uncomfortable with
Ben. But, is the concern that Ben has atypical genitalia, or is it that the
other male employees think Ben is in fact a woman, thereby implying that
trans identities do not exist?
The argument that Ben has atypical genitalia is relatively baseless con-
sidering that a concern of this nature would necessarily implicate men, la-
beled male at birth, who for one reason or another have suffered damage to
their genitals. For example, it is unlikely that a male employee would vocal-
ize feeling uncomfortable with a war veteran who suffered damage to his
genitals or a fellow employee who suffered genital damage in a motorcycle
accident. The more difficult concern would be if the male employee does
not believe that trans identities exist and that Ben is actually a woman.
Here, an employee would have to contend with the fact that GID is a recog-
nized disability in the medical profession and that simply willing this fact
away will not suffice.
The company could also argue that refusing to permit Ben to use the
men's bathroom is not unlawful disability discrimination because everyone
is required to use the bathroom that accords with his/her biological sex, i.e.,
genitals. The crux of the company's argument would be that the bathroom
policy does not single out trans people because it applies equally to all em-
ployees. For example, in Doe v. Bell the New York state court held that a
dress-code policy that prohibited the residents of a male group foster home
from wearing "female attire," even though created in response to the trans
plaintiff, was not discriminatory under the state human rights law disability
protections because it applied equally to all residents.oo This argument
would be difficult to contend with and it is likely the case that if an em-
ployer was able to define "man" by genitals alone and then implement a
policy based on biology alone, such a policy would be valid.
In addition, an employer could argue that being cis is a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). A BFOQ is "an employment qualifica-
tion that, although it may discriminate against a protected class (such as sex,
religion, or national origin), relates to an essential job duty and is consid-
ered reasonably necessary to the operation of the particular business."ol
BFOQs are a defense to disparate treatment under Title VII. The Supreme
Court in Price Waterhouse stated that in "passing Title VII, Congress made
the simple but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and na-
tional origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation
100. Doe v. Bell, 194 Misc. 2d 774, 780 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
101. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 199 (9th ed. 2009).
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of employees."102 Rendering these factors irrelevant is a step in the elimina-
tion of "stubborn but irrational prejudice."IO3 It may well be, after Ulane,
that Congress intended BFOQ defenses to only exclude such things as race
and not necessarily gender or trans status. 04 Regardless, the BFOQ defense
is likely to fail on facts alone, as there are very few jobs that require an
employee to have a certain set of genitals to perform the task. For the jobs
where specific genitals are not required to perform the task but a person's
gendered presentation does matter, the BFOQ defense is particularly inter-
esting. The argument would be, for example, that a specific job requires
only men and that a woman would not be able to do the job. However, this
necessarily raises the question of who qualifies as a man. Is Ben not a man?
And if not, who gets to decide? The employer? The courts? Ben? An analysis
of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note but it remains an interesting
question for future research and advocacy work.
C Disparate Impact Claim
Generally, disparate impact claims require a facially neutral policy that
results in harm to a protected group. In Ben's case, the company's policy is
that bathroom usage is determined by "biological sex," which the company
seems to define as genitals alone. The policy is facially neutral, but has a
disparate impact on trans employees because trans people's lived sex differs
from their sex assigned at birth. The company's policy forces trans people
either to use a bathroom that does not match their lived sex, or to use a
unisex bathroom. Under the company's policy, all cis employees are permit-
ted to use the bathroom in accordance with their lived sex, thus only nega-
tively impacting trans people. For trans employees, the effect of being forced
to use a bathroom that is isolated and different from that used by other
members of their lived sex can be stigmatizing, degrading, and potentially
embarrassing.
The company may argue that the bathroom policy is necessary to pre-
vent employee discomfort and that avoiding employee discomfort promotes
the successful performance of the company. For example, other male em-
ployees might quit or be less productive if Ben were to use the male bath-
room. The question here would be twofold: (1) is the concern for employee
productivity strong enough to permit an employer to deny bathroom access
102. Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 10 (2000) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 239 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)).
103. See Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994).
104. Post cites a lack of a BFOQ for race as proof of this fact. Post, supra note 102, at
7-8.
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to trans employees, and (2) should the law sanction policies that encourage
transphobia? If the law states that an employer may not cater to the racism
or sexism of their employees, it should not allow the accommodation of
other prejudices.
D. Reasonable Accommodation Claim
Once Ben has established that he has a legally cognizable disability, he
is then entitled to request accommodation for this disability from his em-
ployer. The employer need only provide accommodation if it is reasonable
to do so. In Doe v. Bell, the court found that, despite a male group foster
home's neutral policy that "female attire" was prohibited, the facility was
still required to make an exception to the policy as a reasonable accommo-
dation for trans residents. 0 5 Here, the reasonable accommodation would be
to permit Ben to use the men's bathroom. Generally, the requirement to
provide reasonable accommodation to people with disabilities is to enable a
person with a disability to satisfy the essential requisites of a job. Use of the
bathroom during work hours is essential to a person's performance and ful-
fillment of the requirements of any job.
Here, the company would be able to argue that Ben is permitted to
use the handicap bathroom and the women's bathroom. It is not as though
he is without a bathroom entirely. However, the impact of not being able to
use the male bathroom like other men causes anxiety and stress, thus serving
as an obstacle to performing the requirements of his job. The company
could also argue that permitting Ben to use the men's bathroom would
cause them an undue hardship. Here, however, there would be no cost to
the company to accommodate Ben. The men's bathroom would not need to
be altered in any way for Ben to use it.
There are non-financial factors that must also be balanced when as-
sessing undue hardship. According to some federal and state case law, the
fear of lawsuits has been held by the courts to be sufficient to prevent a trans
person from using the bathroom in accordance with lived sex. For example,
in Etsitty,10 6 the Tenth Circuit found that fear of litigation from customers
uncomfortable with using the same bathroom as a trans employee was a
legitimate and lawful excuse for denying access to the trans employee from
using the bathroom in accordance with her lived sex.'0 7 Etsitty can be distin-
guished on the grounds that the plaintiff was utilizing a number of public
bathrooms along her route as a public bus driver.' 08 Here, Ben's usage re-
105. Doe, 194 Misc. 2d at 787.
106. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
107. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224.
108. Esiny, 502 F.3d at 1224.
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quest is limited to the men's bathroom at his place of employment and as
such would not expose the company to general liability. Conversely, a Geor-
gia District Court in Glen v. Brumby noted that the fear of lawsuits over one
bathroom could potentially be a legitimate reason to terminate a trans em-
ployee.o9 The court in Glenn found that the defendant's fear of litigation
was unsubstantiated. However, the court did reach the conclusion that even
with only one bathroom in question, fear of litigation is a valid undue hard-
ship defense to equal bathroom access for trans people.1Io
In addition to a fear of lawsuits, the company might also argue that
they are concerned for the safety of Ben and the other male employees at the
company. For example, in Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College Dis-
trict, a trans professor was denied access to the women's bathroom until
after she had completed sex reassignment surgery."' The community col-
lege where the plaintiff was teaching claimed that for safety reasons it did
not feel comfortable having the trans professor use the women's bathroom.
The court determined that concerns for safety were legitimate, legal, and
nondiscriminatory excuses."l 2 Safety concerns for Ben as he uses the men's
bathroom could be undercut by the fact that Ben may actually feel less safe
using the women's bathroom. Moreover, safety concerns for the other em-
ployees could be dealt with by offering those employees who are uncomfort-
able the opportunity to use the single stall bathroom available in the office
building. In the end, this is a tough defense to combat and presents an
obstacle to the reasonable accommodation claim.
The company's policy, that one's genitals alone determine bathroom
usage, singles out trans people and treats them differently from other em-
ployees at the company. As discussed previously, such company policies are
discriminatory either under the theory of disparate treatment or disparate
impact. Ben is also entitled to reasonable accommodation so that he can
enjoy the right of using the bathroom at work without feeling humiliated
and stigmatized. The questions for the courts will rest on whether it thinks
Ben is in fact a "man" and whether fear of other male employees is enough
to justify denying Ben access to the male bathroom.
IV. Is USING THE DISABILITY LAW FRAMEWORK A GOOD IDEA?
Disability discrimination laws can and do offer new ways to success-
fully protect and affirm trans rights. However, is it worth the potential
stigma associated with labeling trans people as "disabled"? Does such label-
109. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
110. Glenn, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
111. Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App'x 492 (9th Cit. 2009).
112. Kastl, 325 F. App'x at 493-94.
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ing necessitate the medicalization of a person's identity in order to benefit
from the protections? If medicalization is a requirement, what are the impli-
cations for people who, for financial reasons, are unable to access medical
professionals?
Even the most prominent of trans activists and attorneys note that
using disability law, while "significant" in so much as it is capable of enor-
mous success, comes with potential stigma vis-1-vis disability.' 13There is a
gut reaction to the notion of using disability law to advance trans rights.
The automatic reaction is to associate disability with flaw and to therefore
assume that by using disability law, one is actually advancing an argument
that trans people are flawed. However, this notion totally misunderstands
disability law. To automatically associate disability with flaw is, at its core,
ableist. As Dean Spade argues in Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender, the
disability rights movement is "about pointing out that disabled people are
capable of equal participation, but are currently barred from participating
equally by artificial conditions that privilege one type of body or mind and
exclude others.",14 Author Jennifer Levi argues that the purpose of disability
law is to protect people who are "able to work but are prevented from doing
so because of the prejudice of others."'15 In both Spade and Levi's under-
standings of disability law, the language assumes that a person is fully capa-
ble of performing the essential elements of any job and should be protected
through accommodations related to their disability rather than prevented
from performing to the best of their potential. This framework is directly
applicable to trans people. It is premised on the theory that if the social and
physical environment were structured differently, there would be no such
thing as a disability.' 1 6
Trans people are forced to contend with notions of gender and sex
normativity and but for the artificial barriers imposed by society, such as
sex-segregated bathrooms, trans people would have no bar to their full par-
ticipation.' 17 Spade argues that at the core, "trans people are fighting against
entrenched notions about what 'normal' and 'healthy' minds and bodies
are, and fighting to become equal participants with equal access and equal
protection from bias and discrimination."' " The disability framework offers
113. Levi & Klein, supra note 62, at 83.
114. Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J.
15, 34-35 (2003).
115. Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don't Make the Man (or Woman), But Gender Identity Might,
15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90, 105 (2006).
116. See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolu-
tion of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L.
REv. 1341, 1355-56 (1993).




a way to conceive of these difficulties and use them to effectuate change.
Moreover, there is a political benefit to aligning trans discrimination with
disability discrimination. Such an alignment would allow trans people and
people with disabilities to understand one another as part of the same move-
ment against ideas of normative bodies-thus increasing the potential for
coalition building and community organizing around issues of "body"
discrimination.
Some trans advocates argue that one of the harms in using disability
law as an anti-discrimination strategy is the affirmation of GID as a legiti-
mate diagnosis.119 Activist Pauline Park has argued that GID should gener-
ally be abolished as it pathologizes trans people: "I like to say I don't have a
gender identity disorder. Society has a gender disorder."20 Moreover, use of
the disability framework may necessarily stand on a diagnosis of GID and
therefore reinforce normalized, cis-centric notions of gender and sex. For
many trans people, obtaining a GID diagnosis requires producing a narra-
tive of childhood gender dysphoria and sometimes a narrative of compul-
sory heterosexuality. A GID diagnosis also imposes a binary notion of
gender.
Using disability law to protect the rights of trans people could thus
discourage the elimination of the sometimes harmful diagnostic tools and
practices that serve as the foundation of this litigation. Effective use of the
disability law framework could encourage and perpetuate the medicalization
of trans people. 12 1 It comes down to perpetuating a framework that, by its
description, necessarily forces trans protections to be dependent on medical
diagnosis. This line of reasoning necessarily raises the question of whether it
is still worth it to use disability protections.
Some of the concerns critics have raised about disability law reinforc-
ing the power of the GID diagnosis may become less persuasive given the
DSM-V move from Gender Identity Disorder to Gender Dysphoria.122
Moreover, the disability law framework also has the ability to humanize
trans people in the eye of the court.123 The disability framework gives a
court "a construct for understanding why someone cannot conform to a
119. See Levi & Klein, supra note 62, at 89.
120. In Her Own Image: Transgender Activist Pauline Park, THEGULLY.COM (July 2, 2002),
http://www.thegully.com/essays/gaymundo/020702_transgenderp-park.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2011). See also Jason Cromwell, Transmen &FTMS: Identities, Bod-
ies, Gender & Sexualities 22, 125 (1999) ("Identities framed within a medical border
effectively negated individual identity and erased those whose histories, identities,
bodies, and sexualities did not fit within the critical boundaries of 'true
transsexuals."').
121. See Spade, supra note 114, at 33.
122. See supra note 94 and text accompanying (on the upcoming change to the DSM).
123. Levi, supra note 115, at 104.
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gender stereotype and does so in language a judge can understand."2 4 At
some point in the fight for civil liberties, the question of placating the deci-
sion-makers arises. Should you or should you not speak in a language that
makes sense to the judges that will inevitably be deciding these cases?
There are also class-based critiques regarding the accessibility of disa-
bility law protections. Disability law privileges those individuals who can
afford to pay for a diagnosis of GID or Gender Dysphoria. By its very
nature, disability law excludes people who either have no access to or cannot
afford the necessary medical diagnosis, medications, hormones, and/or sur-
geries.125 Unfortunately, this financial barrier is a major problem for many
trans people. According to the 2011 survey by the National Center for
Transgender Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, trans
respondents were "nearly four times more likely to have a household income
of less than $10,000 per year compared to the general population." 26 The
San Francisco Department of Public Health conducted a study in 1999
finding median monthly incomes of $744 for trans women and $1,100 for
trans men.127 This obstacle to many in the trans community demonstrates a
need for a holistic approach-legal activism simply is not enough to tackle
the larger issues of trans discrimination that impact the intersections of
trans identity.
In the author's opinion, disability law's effectiveness as a litigation tool
outweighs its drawbacks to the trans movement because it furthers the goal
of equal access.128 It is an expressive statement to the general public and
specifically to other employees that trans people can be integrated into soci-
ety and should be equal participants. The interest of the trans plaintiff
should be the center of any claim, as it is their rights that are being made
subject to the unfounded fears of the general public. If a successful line of
disability-bathroom cases is brought, trans people will no longer need to
stand in front of the bathrooms wondering, like the poet Ray Durem, how
to use them in this free world. Like the fight for racial equality and the fight
124. Id.
125. Spade, supra note 114, at 35-36. See also Pooja S. Gehi & Gabriel Arkles, Unraveling
Injustice: Race and Class Impact of Medicaid Exclusions of Transition-Related Health
Care for Transgender People, 4 SEXUALiTY RES. & Soc. POL'Y 7, 15 (2007).
126. NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. AND NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK
FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2011), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports
and research/ntds.
127. The Transgender Community Health Project, SAN FRANCIScO DEP'T OF PUB.
HEALTH (1999), available at http://hivinsite.ucsf.edullnSite?pagecftg-02-02.
128. The author recognizes that as a cis woman her point of view is necessarily limited,




for sex equality, the trans fight for equality should use the tools at its dispo-
sal to further the equal rights agenda. Ableist notions of what it means to be
disabled and fear of the perpetuation of trans medicalization should not
stand in the way of a winning argument. As an attorney there is an ethical
obligation to clients to plead winning claims and this option should not be
so readily dismissed. While it is true that there are valid and personal rea-
sons that make disability an imperfect framework, it has been effective and
may continue to provide success in the future. Litigators and trans activists
should at least consider the benefits of the disability argument. 129
A. Note on the Gender-Neutral Bathroom Alternative
The option of gender-neutral facilities in lieu of direct access to the
bathroom that accords with a trans person's lived sex is not a viable alterna-
tive for those trans people that self-identify according to the gender binary.
Gender-neutral facilities in all public accommodations, workplaces, and
schools would provide privacy for trans people who are transitioning or who
do not feel comfortable entering a public bathroom. However, they would
not be a substitute for access to gendered bathrooms for those that want or
need that access. Gender-neutral bathrooms might, however, be a way of
addressing the privacy concerns of those who object to trans people using
the appropriate bathrooms for their gender identity. Any person concerned
with sharing a bathroom with a trans person would be able to use a separate
bathroom.130
"The proper means of attaining transgender equality is not to segre-
gate the group into an extraneous 'other' category," but rather to treat trans
people as the majority is treated and to therefore permit each person bath-
room access based on that person's lived sex.13' Gender-neutral bathrooms
would do little to satisfy the larger, systemic issue of preventing trans people
from fully identifying as and accessing facilities that reaffirm their member-
ship in a gender and sex that accord with their lived identities. Creating a
bathroom that is separate and distinct from the larger population re-in-
scribes notions of "otherness" and serves as its own form of discrimination.
A gender-neutral bathroom offers a stark example of what outsider status is
like: if society is composed only of those who enter the women's room and
129. I am not suggesting that attorneys move forward with the disability framework un-
critically. As Spade states, with regards to the use of disability law, "I use these claims
with extreme caution." Spade, supra note 114, at 35.
130. The Department of Justice made a similar argument regarding the Don't Ask, Don't
Tell repeal. If homophobic soldiers have a problem with gay soldiers, then they can
be placed in separate housing.
131. Elkind, supra note 31, at 927.
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those who enter the men's room, requiring someone to use a third bath-
room tells them they are outside society.132 The goal is not access to just any
bathroom, but rather to equal rights.
CONCLUSION
The use of disability law towards anti-discrimination protection ends,
while certainly not without controversy, is effective in many instances and
should continue to be used by activists and litigators in the fight for trans
rights. Disability law has succeeded in instances where sex, gender, and sex-
ual orientation protections have failed. In the author's opinion, the stigma
around using disability law and the fears of medicalization of trans bodies
and identities should not stand in the way of what has proven to be a suc-
cessful argument. As O'Donnabhain, the plaintiff in the aforementioned tax
case, noted in an interview on NPR in 2011, "I haven't liked this diagnosis
[referring to GID] from the very beginning. But I've got to play the
game." 133 Returning to Ben's question, the answer should be a resounding
yes; prohibiting a trans man from using the men's bathroom at his place of
employment does constitute disability discrimination in those states that
have not explicitly excluded trans people. There is no question that there is
work to be done in order to live in a world where trans discrimination is
taken seriously and trans anti-discrimination protections abound. Until that
time, trans advocates should not only play the game, but should play to
win. t
132. Abigail W. Lloyd, Comment, Defining the Human: Are Transgender People Strangers
to the Law, 20 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150, 193 (2005) (citing Currah &
Minter, supra note 8, at 38-39).
133. Tovia Smith, Transgender Woman, IRS Fight Over Tax Deduction, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO (Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyld= 15327911.
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